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Chapter One 
The International Court of Justice 
Sean D. Murphy 
A . Overview 
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or "Court") is a highly respected 
and authoritative judicial tribunal, lying at the center of the U . N . system, 
with an influence that extends well beyond the legal relations of the Parties 
that appear before it. ' A t the same time, important constraints on its jurisdic-
t ion preclude the Court f rom resolving most disputes between States.^ 
1. Essential Information 
The core instruments creating the ICJ are the U . N . Charter (especially Article 
7(1) and Chapter X I V ) ' and the ICJ Statute." The U . N . Charter provides that 
the ICJ shall be the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations and 
that all U N Member States are ipso facto parties to the ICJ Statute.' As such, 
all 192 Member States o f the United Nations are Members of the ICJ Stat-
ute and thus capable of appearing before the Court in either contentious 
' See generally Mohamed Sameh M. Amr, The Role of ttie International Court of Justice As the 
Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations {The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003). 
^ For information relating to the work of the International Court of Justice, see Yearboolc of 
the International Court of Justice (1947-); International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij 
.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
' Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, Arts. 7(1), 92-96, 59 Stat. 1031 (hereinafter: 
U.N. Charter). 
» Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 
(hereinafter: ICJ Statute). For commentary, see Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat 
& Karin Oellers-Frahm eds.. The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
' U.N. Charter Arts. 92, 93(1). 
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cases or advisory proceedings. States that are not U . N . members (such as 
Switzerland until 2002) are able to adhere to the Court's Statute i f they so 
choose.' Yet the ICJ Statute allows only States to participate in contentious 
cases/ thus precluding contentious cases brought by or against international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, 
or individuals. 
The ICJ Statute is based on the Statute of its predecessor, the Permanent 
Court o f International Justice ("PCIJ"),' which was formed i n the aftermath 
of W o r l d W a r I in conjunction with the League of Nations ("the League"). 
Whereas the "political" League was based in Geneva, the "judicial" PCIJ was 
placed at a distance in the historically neutral country of the Netherlands, 
taking up residence in The Hague at the Peace Palace alongside the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitrat ion. ' Principally operating f rom 1922 to 1939, the PCIJ 
issued some twenty-seven advisory opinions and thirty-two judgments on a 
variety of matters, many concerning disputes arising under the post-World 
W a r I peace treaties and boundary disputes.'" 
Important defects in the PCIJ , however, were corrected with the ICJ. For 
example, membership in the League did not automatically entail member-
ship in the Statute of the PCIJ, which was a disconnect that was thought 
to have weakened the PCIJ. A t the same time, considerable continuity was 
maintained between the two institutions. In addition to remaining in The 
Hague, the ICJ operates under a Statute that is almost verbatim the Statute 
of its predecessor, and hence a variety of procedural decisions of the PCIJ 
remain of direct importance for the ICJ today. Moreover, as the first global 
judicial court, the PCIJ began the judicial process of clarifying and codifying 
core elements of substantive international law and thus generated a stream 
of "first impression" findings that continue to be cited and built upon today 
by the ICJ. Together, these two institutions and their jurisprudence are often 
referred to informally as the " W o r l d Court." 
The ICJ consists of fifteen highly regarded jurists f rom across the globe, 
elected for nine-year, renewable terms by the U . N . General Assembly and 
U . N . Security Counc i l . " To promote a separation between the judges and 
' ICJ Statute Art. 35(2). 
' ICJ Statute Art. 35(1). 
' Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920,6 L.N.T.S. 379 (here-
inafter: PCIJ Statute). 
' See Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1942): A Trea-
tise (New York: MacMillan, 1943). 
" See Permanent Court of International Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/index.phpTpls9 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
" ICJ Statute Arts. 3-4, 13. 
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governments, candidates are not nominated directly by governments. Instead, 
potential judges are nominated by "national groups" formed i n accordance 
with the procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Hence, each State 
establishes a national group of four persons who are to be of "recognized 
competence in international law" and of "high moral character."'^ Ihe 
national group, in turn, decides whether to nominate a person for the ICJ 
and, i f so, whom. ' ' 
From the slate of nominees, five judges of the ICJ are elected every three 
years for nine-year terms,'" thus allowing continuity of membership even 
amidst change. The ICJ Statute provides that persons are to be elected based 
on their independence, character, and expertise, and not their nationality." 
Once elected, judges take no instructions f rom governments. Further, they 
are precluded f rom participating in cases in which they were previously 
involved, which can have the effect of preventing some judges f rom sitting 
i n some cases involving their own States. A judge, however, is not prevented 
f rom sitting in a case involving the State of his or her nationality simply due 
to that connection."* The relatively lengthy term of each judge is thought to 
help further insulate h i m or her f rom deciding cases with an eye to reelec-
tion. Moreover, the judges are paid international civi l servants; they cannot 
be recalled or dismissed by the governments of their nationalities. In the 
event of the resignation or death of a judge, the U . N . General Assembly and 
U . N . Security Counci l hold a special election to ful f i l l the remaining term of 
the vacancy." 
Whi le the judges are independent f rom governments, nationality and 
regional representation remain relevant when composing the Court. The 
Statute provides that no two judges may be of the same nationality and that 
the judges are to be selected so that the "principal legal systems of the world" 
are represented." Though not required by the U . N . Charter or the ICJ Stat-
ute, a "gentlemen's agreement" of the U . N . membership has resulted in seats 
on the Court being allocated so that a specific number of judges are elected 
f rom each of the principal regions of the world: three judges fi-om Afr ican 
States; three judges f rom Asian States; two judges f rom East European States; 
two judges f rom Latin American and Caribbean States; and five judges f rom 
'2 Id. Art. 2. 
Id. Arts. 4-5; see also Lori Damrosch, "The Election of Thomas Buergenthal to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice," 94 Am. J Infl L. 579 (2000). 
'" ICJ Statute Art. 13. 
Id. Art. 2. 
" Id. Arts. 17(2), 31(1). 
" Id. Art. 14. 
•» Id. Arts. 3(1), 9. 
9-36_Giorg8tti_F3.indd 13 10/6/2011 5:11:21PM 
14 Sean D. Murphy 
the Western European "and other" States." Further, while the permanent 
members of the Security Counci l do not have a "veto" with respect to the 
election of ICJ judges because only a majority of nine afiirmative votes is 
required f rom any combination of Counci l members, the five permanent 
members are in a position to influence stronglythe process. Further, it is 
generally accepted that having a judge on the Court of the nationality of the 
five permanent members is valuable i n buttressing the authority and cred-
ibility of the Court, such that it is no surprise that a judge of each permanent 
member is represented on the Court.^° 
Perhaps the most striking indication of the continuing relevance of nation-
ality is the abUity for a State that has no judge of its nationality sitting on 
the Court to appoint an ad hoc judge to sit in a contentious case, who can 
be of the State's nationality or some other nationality.^' The presence of such 
party-appointed adjudicators presumably helps draw States into the Court's 
jurisdiction because, in some sense, it allows the perspective of the State to 
be weU represented during the Court's deliberations. A t the same time, given 
the size of the Court, one or two ad hoc judges are not in a position to dictate 
the outcome of the Court's judgment; indeed, the vote of one ad hoc judge i n 
many instances simply oflFsets that of the other. This element of the Court's 
procedure at times has been criticized as diminishing the Court's overaU 
independence f rom the Parties who appear before it. 
As discussed below, the exact law to be applied by the Court in any par-
ticular case may be limited by the scope of the Court's jurisdiction in that 
case. As a general matter, however. Article 38(1) of the Statute provides that 
the Court is to decide disputes " in accordance with international law" by 
applying four sources: (a) treaties; (b) customary international law; (c) gen-
eral principles o f law; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
"most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."" Article 38(1) has 
had an influence well beyond the Court itself, as the classic starting point of 
any international law analysis entails consideration of these four sources. 
" See Bruno Simma ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2d ed. 2002), p. 1162. 
°^ ICJ Statute Art. 10. A judge from each of the permanent members has been on the Court 
since its inception, with the exception of a gap between 1967 and 1985 when there was no 
Chinese judge. See Bruno Sirama ed.. The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
op. cit., p. 1161. The ICJ judges of U.S. nationality to date have been: Green Hackworth 
(1946-61); PhUip Jessup (1961-70); Hardy Cross DiUiard (1970-79); Richard Baxter (1979-
80); Stephen Schwebel (I98I-2000); Thomas Buergenthal (2000-10); and Joan Donoghue 
(2010-present). 
" ICJ Statute Art. 31(l)-(3). 
Id. Art. 38(1). 
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2. Jurisdiction 
States cannot be sued before the ICJ without their consent. Joining the United 
Nations and thereby ipso facto becoming a party to the ICJ's Statute does not 
automatically expose a State to the Court's jurisdiction.-^' Adhering to the 
ICJ's Statute simply opens the door for a State to sue or be sued before the 
Court, but it does not allow the State to go through that door. Instead, some 
further form of consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction must exist. This requirement 
of further state consent is why most of the 192 U . N . Member States have 
never appeared before the Court in a contentious case and why the Court is 
regarded as an important, but not dominant, player i n the field of interna-
tional dispute resolution. 
There are three means by which a State can express consent to the juris-
diction of the Court. States can accept the Court's jurisdiction on an ad hoc 
basis for the adjudication of an existing dispute.^" For example, in July 2010, 
Burkina Faso and Niger jointly submitted a frontier dispute to the Court for 
the purpose of determining their mutual boundary in a particular sector.^' 
Whi le such a dispute is "contentious" i n the sense that there are differing 
views between the two States as to the relevant facts or law, both States agree 
ah initio to bring the dispute to the Court for resolution. 
Alternatively, States can accept the Court's jurisdiction by concluding a 
bilateral or multilateral treaty that provides for future jurisdiction over cer-
tain issues in the event that a dispute arises.^* This form of jurisdiction is 
l imited not just by the need to f ind a relevant treaty, but also by the terms 
of jurisdiction set forth i n that treaty. The relevant treaty might provide for 
broad jurisdiction, such as the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement 
("Pact of Bogota"), which provides in Article X X X I : "Parties declare that they 
recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of the 
Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agree-
ment so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical 
nature that arise among them. . . . "" For example, Costa Rica invoked this 
'^ The United States and the Soviet Union were adamantly opposed at the 1945 San Francisco 
conference to automatic compulsory jurisdiction for the Court. See Ruth B. Russell, A His-
tory of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the Un ited States, 1940-1945 (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 884-90. 
" ICJ Statute Art. 36(1). 
" Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Niger), Special Agreement, (July 21, 2010), available at http:// 
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/15986.pdf. 
ICJ Statute Art. 36(1). Treaties pre-dating the existence of the ICJ that provide for juris-
diction of the PCIJ are also regarded, under the ICJ Statute, as triggering ICJ jurisdiction. 
Id. Art. 37. 
" American Treaty on Pacific Settlement Art. XXXI, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55. 
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provision in November 2010 to seize the Court of jurisdiction in a dispute 
against Nicaragua, which concerned an alleged incursion into and occupa-
tion of Costa Rican territory by Nicaragua/* 
But the treaty invoked might provide for much narrower jurisdiction, l i m -
ited only to the specific subject matter of the treaty itself. For example, the 
Convention Against Genocide sets forth various obligations of States with 
respect to preventing and punishing genocide. Article IX provides that dis-
putes between parties arising under the convention shall be submitted to the 
ICJ at the request of one of the parties." Other types of disputes unrelated 
to the Convention cannot be submitted to the Court. The effect of such l i m -
ited jurisdiction is that disputes can sometimes be presented to the Court 
in a rather skewed fashion. For instance, when Georgia sought to sue Rus-
sia for an alleged incursion by Russia into Georgia's territory in 2008, the 
only treaty available to which both States were a Party that provided for the 
Court's jurisdiction was the Convention on the Elimination of A l l Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.™ Consequentiy, Georgia's case was entirely cast in 
terms of whether Russia's conduct constituted racial discrimination within 
the meaning of the Convention, not in terms of whether it constituted an 
unlawfii l use of force or intervention in Georgia." 
Since this form of jurisdiction is predicated on the presence of a treaty 
obligation accepting the Court's jurisdiction, it is critical to assess whether 
a State, in joining a multilateral treaty, filed a reservation l imit ing or reject-
ing the provision that provides for the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, when the 
United States ratified the Convention Against Genocide in 1988, it included 
a reservation stating that, before any dispute could be submitted to the Court 
under Article IX, "the specific consent of the United States is required in 
each case."'^ Consequently, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ser-
bia & Montenegro) sought to sue the Uni ted States under the Convention 
Against Genocide for acts associated with N A T O ' s bombing campaign 
'^ Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http:// 
vnvw.icj -cij .org/docket/files/150/16281 .pdf 
" Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Art. IX, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
'° International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
" Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Memorial of Georgia, (Sep. 2, 2009), available at http:// 
vrww.icj-cij .org/docket/files/140/16097.pdf 
" United States: Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Nov. 4, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 
754, 782 (1989). 
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against Serbia in 1999, the ICJ found that there was no jurisdiction and dis-
missed the case/ ' 
The third way i n which jurisdiction may arise is under the "optional clause" 
or "compulsory jurisdiction." Here, the State Parties to the ICJ Statute may 
make a unilateral declaration that "they recognize as compulsory ipso facto 
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the 
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court i n all legal d i s p u t e s . . i n v o l v -
ing issues of law or fact governed by rules of international law.'* Most States 
have not accepted this "compulsory jurisdiction" of the Court. O f the 192 
Member States of the United Nations, only 66 have accepted the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction as of early 2011." Moreover, many of those accep-
tances contain conditions, limitations, or reservations that significantly l imit 
the State's consent. The only Permanent Member of the Security Counci l that 
currently accepts the Court's compulsory jurisdiction is the United Kingdom 
and, even there, the acceptance is conditioned by several significant reserva-
tions that make it diff icuh to sue the Uni ted Kingdom before the Court . ' ' 
Nevertheless, cases are regularly filed before the Court invoking this com-
pulsory jurisdiction. For example, in June 2010, Australia sued Japan claim-
ing that Japan's continued pursuit of a large-scale whaling program violated 
Japan's obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. '^ The Convention, however, does not provide for the Court's juris-
diction. Thus, Australia invoked the declarations accepting the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction made by Australia in 2002 and Japan in 2007, and then 
called upon the Court to determine i f the Convention had been violated." 
Even i f the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a claim, the Court 
might regard a claim as inadmissible, (although the exact distinction between 
the two concepts is not always clear). Thus, in certain cases, the Court has 
relied upon a rule of customary international law known as the "local rem-
edies rule." Before a State may espouse a claim on behalf of its national, it 
must show that the national has exhausted all available legal remedies in 
the courts and administrative agencies of the State against which the claim 
" See Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916, f5 29, 34 (June 2). 
" ICJ Statute Art. 36(2); see J.G. Merrills, "The Optional Clause Revisited," 64 Brit. Y.B. Int'l 
L. 197 (1993). 
" For the Ust, see Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, http:// 
www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=58tp2=18q)3=3 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
See id. 
" International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 
U.N.T.S. 72. 
" Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), Application instituting proceedings, (May 31, 
2010), available at http://www.ici-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf. 
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is brought; failure to do so wi l l make the claim inadmissible/ ' The rule is 
designed to permit a State to remedy a wrong at the national level before it is 
transformed into a dispute on the international plane, where it might unnec-
essarily disrupt relations between States. Moreover, it provides the Court 
with an opportunity to decline to pass upon a dispute that might place it 
in direct conflict with the tendency of some States toward strong constitu-
tional autonomy. Other forms of admissibility issues can arise, such as in the 
context of the standing of a State to bring a case"*" or mootness of the issue 
presented in the case."" 
Separate f rom the Court's jurisdiction over contentious cases between two 
States, the Court also has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on legal 
questions.*^ The advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ may only be invoked by 
U . N . organs and by the specialized agencies of the Uni ted Nations who have 
been authorized to do so.*" Although advisory opinions are non-binding, 
they do have some juridical authority. A m o n g other things, they can legiti-
mate certain conduct of States and organizations, and they invariably have 
significance for a legal system in which judicial precedents are scarce.*'' 
3. Procedural Overview 
The key instrument with respect to the procedure of the Court, other than 
Chapter III of the ICJ Statute, are the Rules of Court (especially Part III), 
which were adopted in 1978 and thereafter amended on occasion.*' Wri t ten 
and oral pleadings are submitted to the Court in either English or French, 
after which the Court privately deliberates and issues its decision. Conten-
tious cases are often heard in phases, with separate decisions issued on: 
(I) requests for provisional (or interim) measures of protection;*' (2) requests 
» See Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21). 
" See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber, v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18). 
" See Nuclear Tests (Ausd. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.). 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20). 
" See Mahasen Mohammad Aljaghoub, The Advisory Function of tiie International Court of 
Justice 1946-2005 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2006). 
" U.N. Charter Art. 96. 
For further detail on the Court's jurisdiction, see Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of 
the International Court, 1920-2004 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 4th ed. 2006); Gbenga 
Oduntan, The Law and Practice of The International Court of Justice (1945-1996): A Cri-
tique of the Contentious and Advisory Jurisdictions (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 
1999). 
Rules of Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=38rp3=0 (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2011). 
« ICJ Statute Art. 41. 
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for intervention by third-party States;"^ (3) challenges to the Court's jurisdic-
t ion or the admissibility of the claim; (4) the merits of the claim; and (5) the 
proper damages i f liability is found. 
A contentious case commences with the filing of an Application to the 
Court, specifying the nature of the dispute, the basis of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, the alleged violations, and the remedy sought."' If provisional measures 
of protection are sought, an expedited hearing and order wi l l take place for 
disposition of that particular request,"' but normally the case proceeds with 
greater deliberation. In such an expedited proceeding, and without pre-
judging the outcome on the merits, the Court wi l l consider whether there 
appears to be prima facie jurisdiction and a danger of irreparable damage 
due to ongoing conduct.'" Otherwise, after a meeting of the Parties with the 
President of the Court, a schedule is set for the filing of a Memor ia l and 
Counter-Memorial , which may also be followed by a second round of writ-
ten pleadings in the fo rm of a Reply and Rejoinder." If a Respondent State 
seeks to challenge the Court's jurisdiction over the dispute, its objection 
must be filed within three months after the filing of the Memor i a l . " Further, 
i f the Respondent wishes to file a counter-claim against the Applicant, it 
may do so along vnth its Counter-Memorial , so long as the counter-claim 
is directly connected with the subject matter of the claim and is within the 
Court's jurisdiction." 
The written pleadings are not made public unti l the date of the oral hear-
ing, which is open to the public. A t the oral hearing, there is typically a first 
round of presentations by the Applicant and the Respondent, followed by a 
second round. The judges of the Court rarely ask questions; when they do, 
it often occurs at the end of the oral proceeding, with a request that the Par-
ties respond in writing within a short time period. The failure of a Party to 
appear before the Court for the written or oral proceedings does not prevent 
the Court f rom proceeding with the case. The Court, however, must still 
determine that the claim before it is well founded in fact and law because 
default judgments are not issued.'" 
" Id. Arts. 62-63. 
*" Rules of Court Arts. 38, 41. 
Id. Arts. 73-74. 
See, e.g.. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 353, 55 117, 128-29, 143 (Oct. 15). 
=' Rules of Court Arts. 44-45, 49. 
Id. Art. 79. 
" Id Art. 80. 
"" ICJ Statute Art. 53. 
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ICJ Statute Article 26 allows the Court to establish a chamber of judges 
to decide a case," which the Court typically is inclined to do i f two States 
appearing before it request such a chamber and identify the judges they wish 
appointed to the chamber. Moreover, the chamber can consist of any com-
bination of judges; unlike the PCIJ Statute, there is no requirement that the 
chamber represent "the principal legal systems of the wor ld . "" For instance, 
i n Gulf of Maine, Canada and the United States informed the Court that they 
desired a chamber consisting of five ICJ judges identified by the Parties.'^ 
Some special rules apply in the context of chamber proceedings, but most 
procedures remain the same and chamber judgments are regarded as judg-
ments of the Court as a whole.'* 
Judgments issued by the ICJ in contentious cases are final, without further 
appeal, and binding on the parties." A t the same time, i f the meaning of the 
judgment is unclear, a Party may request an interpretation from the Court. '" 
Further, i f an important fact unknown at the time of the proceedings comes 
to light, a Party may request a revision of the judgment." In addition to the 
judgment reached by the majority (with the President casting a second vote 
i f necessary to break a tie)," each judge may issue a concurring or dissenting 
opinion or declaration.' ' 
Once the judgment is issued, each U . N . Member State "undertakes to 
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to 
which it is a party."'" Yet in crafting the U . N . Charter and the ICJ Statute, 
States elected not to include any provisions expressly addressing the legal 
effect of ICJ judgments within national legal systems, such as whether they 
provide a basis for private rights of action in national courts. Rather, the 
recourse envisaged by the U . N . Charter is for the victorious party to appeal 
non-compliance to the U . N . Security Counci l , "which may, i f it deems neces-
sary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment."" To date, in only one case has the Applicant State, 
" Id. Art. 26. 
PCIJ Statute Art. 9. 
" See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). 
See ICJ Statute Art. 27. 
" Id. Arts. 59-60. 
«> Id. Art. 60. 
" Id. Art. 61. 
« Id. Art. 55. 
" Id. Art. 57. 
" U.N. Charter Art. 94(1). 
Id. Art. 94(2). 
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Nicaragua, requested that the Security Counci l take action to enforce the 
judgment when the Respondent State, the Uni ted States, lost on the merits. 
Exercising its prerogative as a permanent member of the Counci l , the United 
States vetoed the proposed resolution.' ' 
In advisory opinion proceedings, all U . N . Member States are invited to 
make written and oral submissions. Some special rules of the ICJ Statute and 
Rules of Court apply with respect to advisory proceedings, but the Court is 
also guided in those proceedings by the procedural rules set for contentious 
cases.'' 
B . Review of the Case Law 
In addition to the actual texts of the Court's decisions" and the pleadings 
before it made by States," various descriptive and analytical digests exist to 
assist in researching the Court's decisions,™ as well as analyses i n books and 
periodicals.^' Since the case law of the ICJ is far too extensive to summarize 
in fu l l i n this chapter, the following is a review of some of the most signifi-
cant decisions of the Court in selected areas of international law. 
See U.N. Security Council, Excerpts from Verbatim Records Discussing I.C.J. Judgment 
in Nicaragua v. United States, 25 I.L.M. 1337, 1352-65 (1986). See generally Constanze 
Schulte, Compliance witli Decisions of the International Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
For further discussion of the practice of the Court's procedures, see Shabtai Rosenne, 
The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2004, op. cit.; Terry D. Gill ed., 
Rosenne's The V/orld Court: What It Is and How It Works (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 6th 
rev. ed. 2003); Chandan Bala, International Court of Justice: Its Functioning and Settlement 
of Disputes (New Delhi: Deep & Deep PubUcations, 1997); Derek W. Bowett et al., The 
International Court of Justice: Process, Practice and Procedure (London: British Institute for 
International 8c Comparative Law, 1997). 
The Court publishes its decisions in volumes entitled Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opin-
ions and Orders (1947-). 
The Court publishes the pleadings and submissions of States and other materials in Plead-
ings, Oral Arguments and Documents (1948-). 
The United Nations has published the Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions, and 
Orders of the International Court of Justice in four volumes in 1992, 1998, 2003, and 2008. 
Also, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law pub-
lished the Pontes Juris Gentium: Digest of the Decisions of the International Court of Justice 
in 1978 and 1990 as well as the World Court Digest in 1993, 1997, and 2002. 
See, e.g., H.W.A. Thirlway, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989, Part One," 60 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L 4 (1989). 
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1. Sources of International Law 
a. Customary International Law 
In S.S. "Lotus,"''^ the PCIJ was aslced to decide whether Turkey could exer-
cise national jurisdiction over a French national for negligent conduct that 
occurred on a French vessel, which resulted i n a collision on the high seas 
that harmed a Turkish vessel and nationals. In determining whether any 
rule of customary international law prohibited Turkey's exercise of national 
jurisdiction, the Court considered the nature and scope of state practice on 
the issue, findings of international and national tribunals, and the writings 
of publicists. This approach has influenced subsequent judicial analyses of 
whether a norm of customary international law exists. Further, the Court 
articulated a particular perspective when assessing the lawfulness of state 
practice - now commonly referred to as the "Lotus principle" - in which a 
State's conduct is presumed lawful unless a prohibition against the conduct 
can be found in international law. According to the Court: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing indepen-
dent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restric-
tions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed." 
S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. 
Id. at 18; see also Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20) (finding that the purposes of the 
United Nations "are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate 
them are unlimited. Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of 
these common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action"); Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 5 269 (June 27) 
{"(I)n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by 
the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign 
State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception."); Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, J 52 (July 8) 
("State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not 
result from an absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of 
prohibition."); Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, f 56 (July 22, 2010), available at www 
.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (proceeding on the basis that, in relation to the legal-
ity of a specific act under international law, it is not necessary to demonstrate a permissive 
rule so long as there is no prohibition). 
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The relationship of treaties to customary international law was at issue i n 
North Sea Continental ShelfJ'' where Denmark and Germany urged the Court 
to f ind a customary international law rule requiring the use of an equidis-
tance line for delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent States 
when those States could not otherwise agree upon delimitation. Denmark 
and Germany in part argued that Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf" had helped generate a rule of customary international law 
binding upon Germany, even though Germany had not ratified or acceded 
to the Convention. Whi le accepting that a treaty provision can help create a 
norm of customary law, the Court rejected the argument in that instance by 
an analysis that focused on whether the relevant treaty provision had a " f i in -
damentally norm-creating character," the length of time the treaty provision 
was in force, the number of States adhering to the treaty, state practice since 
enactment of the treaty by both Parties and non-Parties, and whether that 
practice evinced a belief that the relevant norm was legally-compelled.^' 
The Court returned to this issue in Military and Paramilitary Activities, 
this time in the context of whether Article 2(4) of the Charter - prohibiting 
transnational uses of force - had generated not just a treaty obligation upon 
U . N . Member States, but also an obligation under customary international 
law. One problem in reaching such a finding was the fact that there had been 
numerous incidents of transboundary uses of force in the post-Charter era, 
which arguably defeated any consistent state practice establishing a custom-
ary norm. The Court, however, found that the customary norm did exist. In 
a finding highly relevant for the theory of customary international law, the 
Court stated: 
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the 
rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have 
refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention 
in each other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rig-
orous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary 
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, 
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent 
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, 
not as indications of the recognition of a new rule." 
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. 
North Sea Continental Shelf, op. cit., 70-81. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, op. cit., f 186. 
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The Court has recognized, however, that as a customary norm emerges, it is 
possible for any particular State to opt out of the norm, so long as it unam-
biguously and persistently objects to the new norm while it is emerging and 
thereafter. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the Court found that a customary 
rule Umiting the drawing of a baseline across a bay to ten miles had not 
emerged, but went on to say that, even i f such a norm had emerged, Norway 
would not be bound "inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to 
apply it to the Norwegian coast."'* A t the same time, the Court has main-
tained that certain norms of international law are so fiindamental in nature 
that no State may derogate f rom them, as either a persistent objector or by 
means of a new treaty obligation. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the 
Court referred to the view with apparent approval that Article 2(4) of the 
U . N . Charter "constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international 
law having the character of ;'ws cogens,"''^ and, in Armed Activities in the Ter-
ritory of the Congo, the Court found that the prohibition on genocide was 
a norm having jus cogens character, though that alone was not a basis for 
establishing the Court's jurisdiction over an alleged violation.*" 
b. Treaty Law 
The W o r l d Court has interpreted many treaties over the course of its exis-
tence. In its recent holdings, the Court has helped soUdify key legal stan-
dards set forth i n the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,*' even in 
circumstances where that treaty was not directly binding upon the Parties 
with respect to the treaty at hand. O n the important issue of how treaties 
should be interpreted, the Court stated in Genocide Convention, brought by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, that 
what obligations the Convention imposes upon the parties to it depends on 
the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Convention read in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose. To confirm the meaning resulting 
from that process or to remove ambiguity or obscurity or a manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable result, the supplementary means of interpretation to which 
recourse may be had include the preparatory work of the Convention and the 
circumstances of its conclusion. Those propositions, reflected in Articles 31 and 
Fislieries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18); see aUo Asylum (Colom. v. 
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 20). 
" Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, op. cit, f 190. 
™ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 
6, 5 64 (Feb. 3). 
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are well recognized as part 
of customary international law 
A particularly interesting case concerning the circumstances under which 
a State may avoid a treaty obligation is Gabcikovo-Nagymaros ProjectP In 
that case, the Court rejected Hungary's "changed circumstances" (sometimes 
referred to as reijus sic stantibus or force majeure) argument that a treaty 
concluded during the C o l d War between two communist governments -
Hungary and Czechoslovakia - for the building of a hydroelectric project 
along the Danube River had been radically transformed by the fall of com-
munism in Eastern Europe, the rise of environmentalism, and the alleged 
diminishing economic viability of the venture, thereby allowing Hungary to 
terminate the treaty. According to the Court, the prevailing national political 
situation and economic systems of the Parties when the treaty was concluded 
were not closely hnked to the object and purpose of the treaty, the economic 
viability of this particular project had not been radically transformed, and 
new developments in environmental knowledge or environmental law were 
foreseeable when the treaty was concluded.*" 
The Court also rejected Hungary's argimient that it was impossible to 
complete the project as contemplated in the treaty, given that an essential 
object was to do this through joint exploitation in an environmentally sound 
manner. According to the Court, the treaty contemplated mechanisms for 
altering the project through negotiation i f there were environmental issues, 
and any difficulty with joint exploitation was attributable to Hungary's 
own conduct in trying to withdraw f rom the project.*' As such, the Court 
accepted the availability of an "impossibility" argument, but only in extreme 
circumstances. 
c. Other Sources 
Given the existence of numerous international organizations, the Court at 
times has been called upon to consider the normative value o f resolutions 
adopted by organs of international organizations. In the Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion, the Court was urged by some States to find a prohibition 
on the use or threat to use nuclear weapons within a series of U . N . General 
Assembly resolutions. The Court acknowledged that 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 191, f 160 (Feb. 26) (citations 
omitted). 
" Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sep. 25). 
Id. J 104. 
Id f? 102-03. 
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General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes 
have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence 
important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris. To estabhsh whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, 
it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also 
necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a 
series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required 
for the establishment of a new rule."' 
In that instance, however, the Court viewed the relevant resolutions as not 
establishing the existence of a norm prohibiting nuclear weapons; the resolu-
tions in question were too equivocal and, when adopted, had garnered sub-
stantial numbers of negative votes or abstentions.*' Ultimately, relying upon 
principles emanating f rom treaties on the law of war, the Court found that 
the use of nuclear weapons, as a general matter, would be unlawful, but in 
certain extreme circmnstances involving the very survival of a State, such use 
might be lawfiil.** 
2. Subjects of International Law 
In the course of its decisions, the Court has made important pronounce-
ments relevant to the various "subjects" of international law, including 
States, international organizations, and persons. For example, in its advisory 
opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Court was asked to 
opine on whether that declaration was unlawful, given Kosovo's status as 
a province of Serbia, which opposed Kosovo's independence. To a certain 
extent, placement of the matter before the Court was viewed as a test as to 
whether a new State had been formed. Staying within the narrow confines of 
the question placed before it, the Court did not directly pass upon Kosovo's 
statehood, nor upon whether other States might recognize that statehood. 
Instead, the Court simply concluded that the declaration of independence 
issued by Kosovo's leaders violated neither general international law nor the 
specific regime set up by the Security Counci l for international administra-
tion of Kosovo after the 1998-99 crisis.*' 
W i t h respect to international organizations, the Court issued a landmark 
ruling in its 1949 advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations.'^ Coming early i n the life of the United 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, op. cit, 5 70. 
Id. Jf 71-73. 
Id. f 5 95-97. 
See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, op. cit 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11). 
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Nations, and with implications for all U . N . speciaUzed agencies and argu-
ably all international organizations, the opinion tackles whether the United 
Nations has sufficient "personality" separate f rom its Member States so as 
to allow it to pursue a diplomatic claim. Based upon an analysis of the U . N . 
Charter, including the powers and status conferred upon its organs, the 
opinion found that sufficient personality existed to support pursuit of a dip-
lomatic claim both for direct injury to the organization and injury to persons 
i n the employ of the organization because the latter type of claim was not 
only efficient, but also helped protect the integrity of the Uni ted Nations. 
Moreover, the opinion found that such a claim could be brought not just 
against a U . N . Member State, but even against a n o n - U . N . Member State, 
because "fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the 
international community [in 1945], had the power, in conformity with inter-
national law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international 
personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together 
with capacity to bring international claims."" That finding, which solidified 
the legal status of international organizations as subjects of international law, 
arguably helped pave the way for the human rights movement by vividly 
demonstrating that States were no longer the sole possessor of rights and 
obligations on the international plane. 
3. Rules on State Responsibility 
Especially in two of its cases - Military and Paramilitary Activities brought 
by Nicaragua and Genocide Convention brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina - the 
Court has significantly confirmed and clarified the standards for attributing 
conduct to a State. In Genocide Convention, the Court asserted that conduct 
perpetrated by persons or entities having the status of "organs" of a govern-
ment under its internal law are acts attributable to that government's State.'^ 
Persons or entities that are not state organs may nevertheless be equated 
with state organs "provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act 
i n 'complete dependence' on the State, of which they are ultimately merely 
the instrument."" If the persons or entities are neither a state organ nor act-
ing in complete dependence on the State, their conduct may nevertheless be 
attributed to the State i f it can be shown that they 
" Id. at 185. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, op. cit., f 386. 
" Id. f 392 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, op. cit., 
f 110). 
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acted in accordance with that State's instructions or under its "effective con-
trol." It must however be shown that this "effective control" was exercised, or 
that the State's instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which 
the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions 
taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.'" 
Even i f the conduct was not attributable to the State at the time it was under-
taken, it can become so i f the government thereafter expresses approval of 
or endorses the conduct. ' ' 
Normally, breaches of international law occur as between the two States 
directly involved in the underlying conduct, such as harm by one State to 
the national of another. However, in Barcelona Traction, the Court adopted 
the concept of obligations erga omnes, meaning obligations owed by a State 
towards the international community as a whole. For those obhgations, all 
States have an interest in whether the obligation is upheld. According to 
the Court, "[s]uch obligations derive, for example, in contemporary inter-
national law, f rom the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as 
also f rom the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person, including protection f rom slavery and racial discrimination." ' ' 
This concept of erga omnes obligations has not led to widespread advance-
ment of claims by States; indeed, the Court itself seemed to disfavor the idea 
that all States could pursue claims based on such obligations when it dis-
missed cases brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Afr ica for abuse 
of its international mandate i n South West Af i - i ca ." Nevertheless, this con-
cept has helped reinforce the idea that certain international obligations are 
especially important and that the broad community of States has an interest 
i n and can speak to whether those obligations are being transgressed. 
4. Privileges and Immunities in National Systems 
In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,^^ the Court considered the legality of the 
issuance of a Belgian arrest warrant against the Republic of the Congo's M i n -
ister of Foreign Affairs for alleged war crimes and crimes against human-
ity, pursuant to a Belgian criminal law statute that allowed for "universal 
'" Id., f 400 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, op. cit, 
f 115). 
See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 
5 71 (May 24). 
" Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, f 34 
(Feb. 5). 
" See South West Africa, op. cit, f 88 (finding that the concept of actio popularis was "not 
known to international law as it stands at present"). 
'» Arrest Warrant of Apr. 11, 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). 
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jurisdiction," or jurisdiction in circumstances where Belgium's direct inter-
ests or nationals were not involved. The Court declined to pass upon the 
permissibility of such a statute" and instead focused on the immunity of an 
incumbent Foreign Minister f rom criminal jurisdiction. Since no relevant 
treaties spoke to the matter, the Court's judgment turned upon customary 
international law, thus creating a precedent of relevance for all other com-
parable circumstances. The Court found that under customary international 
law, state officials are entitled to immunity f r o m national jurisdiction when 
they travel abroad - including from charges of war crimes or crimes against 
hiunanity - so as to allow for the effective performance of their functions 
on behalf of States.'™ A t the same time, the Court noted that "[j]urisdic-
tional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain 
offenses; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies f rom all criminal 
responsibility,""" thus potentially leaving open the door to prosecution after 
the official leaves office. 
O n several occasions, the Court has also addressed the protections accorded 
under the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular immunities,'"^ 
thereby confirming their core provisions. In its 1980 judgment in U.S. Diplo-
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court unequivocally condemned the 
seizure by Iran of U.S. diplomatic and consular staff, ordered their release, 
and ordered the restoration of the U.S. embassy and consulate premises, 
property, archives, and documents."" 
In a series of decisions against the United States, the Court upheld the 
right of an alien to be notified of the right to contact his or her consulate 
about the alien's detention.'"'' Moreover, the Court maintained that a failure 
to provide such notification required U.S. courts to review and reconsider 
convictions of aliens on death row as a remedy, so as to see whether the lack 
of notification was prejudicial. '" ' Although U.S. courts d id not uniformly 
Three judges issued a separate opinion that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States 
is nearing the status of customary law given an international consensus that those who 
commit international crimes should not have impunity. Id. 51-52 (joint separate opin-
ion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal). 
Id. f 53. 
Id f 60. 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, op. cit., f 95. 
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (f v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1998 
I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena and Other 
Mexican NaUonals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
See LaGrand, op. cit, f 125. 
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provide such review and reconsideration,"" the Court's decisions prompted 
the U.S. Government to embark on a widespread campaign to educate state 
and local police officials in the Uni ted States as to the obligation to provide 
such notification to aliens when they are detained. 
5. Injury to Aliens and Human Rights 
The Court has firmly established in international law certain procedural rules 
relating to the protection of foreign nationals or their investments in host 
States, such as the continuous nationality rule"" or rules on protection of 
shareholders i n corporations.'"* For example, as previously noted, the Court 
has reaffirmed the "rule that local remedies must first be exhausted before 
international proceedings may be instituted."'"' Yet the Court has helped 
refine the rule, such as by clarifying that there might be exceptional circum-
stances that relieve the injured party f rom exhausting local remedies (e.g., 
where they effectively have been pursued by the bankruptcy trustee of an 
expropriated subsidiary)."" The burden of showing that local remedies exist, 
however, falls upon the host State. Even then, 
while the local remedies that must be exhausted include all remedies of a legal 
nature, judicial redress as well as redress before administrative bodies, admin-
istrative remedies can only be taken into consideration for purposes of the local 
remedies rule if they are aimed at vindicating a right and not at obtaining a 
favour, unless they constitute an essential prerequisite for the admissibility of 
subsequent contentious proceedings.'" 
A s for substantive law, the Court has addressed traditional standards of pro-
tection, such as the national treatment standard and min imum standards of 
protection, arising under either customary international law or treaty law."^ 
Further, more contemporary standards arising under human rights law have 
featured in several of the Court's decisions. In the advisory opinion on Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, the Court found that the con-
struction of a barrier by Israel that enclosed parts of the West Bank posed 
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507-U (2008) (finding that the treaties pursuant to 
which the ICJ issued the judgment were not self-executing in U.S. law). 
See Panevezys-Saldutiskis RaUway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16. 
'™ See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., op. cit., 55 46-49; Ahmadou Sadio 
Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 103, f f 54-89. 
Interhandel, op. cit., at 27. 
"» See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, f 53 (July 20). 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Preliminary Objections, op. cit., f 47. 
See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), op. cit.; Rights of Nationals of the United States 
of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27). 
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a serious risk of altering the demographic composition of "occupied Pales-
tinian territory."'" As such, it both impeded "the exercise by the Palestin-
ian people of its right to self-determination" and constituted a violation of 
Article 12(1), protecting freedom of movement and choice of residence, and 
Article 17(1), protecting privacy, family and home,"** of the International 
Covenant on C i v i l and Political Rights ( " I C C P R " ) . ' " A m o n g the important 
findings of the Court i n this advisory opinion was that the I C C P R apphes 
not just to a State's conduct within its own territory, but also "is applicable 
i n respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its 
own territory."'" 
In the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the Court concluded that an alien's expul-
sion violated his rights under I C C P R Article 13, but the Court also passed 
upon human rights standards within a regional human rights treaty, in that 
instance. Article 12 (4) of the Afr ican Charter on Huma n and Peoples' Rights . ' " 
Both the global and regional standards only allow expulsion pursuant to a 
decision taken in accordance with the law. Further, the Court found that the 
alien's arrest and detention prior to expulsion violated I C C P R Article 9 and 
Afr ican Charter Article 6, both of which protect the liberty and security of a 
person. '" In doing so, the Court is helping to harmonize global and regional 
human rights systems. 
6. Use of Force 
The ICJ has issued several decisions of significance on the topic of transna-
tional uses of force. Perhaps the most famous is Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, brought by Nicaragua against the United States in the mid-1980s, 
i n which the Court made several important findings with respect to the right 
of self-defense. A m o n g other things, the Court concluded that certain types 
of conduct - the laying of mines in Nicaraguan internal or territorial waters 
or attacks on Nicaraguan ports, o i l installations, and a naval base - constitute 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 5J 122, 134 (July 9). 
Id. 128, 134. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, op. cit., f i l l . 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 5f 64-74 (Nov. 30, 
2010); available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/103/16244.pdf; see African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Judgment, op. cit., Jf 75-85. 
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a violation of the international prohibition on the use of force as reflected in 
U . N . Charter Article 2(4).'"» 
While sometimes use of force can be justified in self-defense, contempo-
rary international lav? as reflected i n U . N . Charter Article 51 requires that 
the State be responding to an "armed attack" that is imputable to the State 
against which force is being used.'^° In this case, allegations that Nicaragua 
was sending armed bands, groups, or irregulars across a border against E l 
Salvador, or providing weapons or logistical support to such groups, d id not 
qualify as an "armed attack" because that conduct did not involve acts of 
armed force of such gravity that they amounted to an armed attack.'^' N o r 
was there sufficient evidence that the support was imputable to Nicaragua. 
Even i f an armed attack by Nicaragua did exist, for the United States to 
engage in collective self-defense in support of E l Salvador or any other State 
i n the region, there must be a contemporaneous request for such assistance 
f rom the vict im State, which the Court concluded d id not exist on the facts 
of the case.'" Furthermore, i f truly acting in coUective self-defense, a State is 
obhgated under Article 51 to notify the U . N . Security Councf l that it is doing 
so, a step not taken by the Uni ted States i n this case.'" 
Even i f all those hurdles were overcome, the Court stressed that any U.S. 
act of self-defense must satisfy the requirements of necessity and propor-
tionality. Here, the U.S. conduct was not necessary because E l Salvador had 
already successfully repulsed the rebel offensive at the time the United States 
acted and was not proportionate because the relevant conduct (e.g., mining 
of ports and attacks on o i l installations) did not correlate to Nicaragua's 
aid to E l Salvador rebels.'" The Court returned to the issue of necessity and 
proportionality in Oil Platforms when assessing the legality of U.S. attacks 
i n 1987-88 upon three Iranian offshore ofl platforms i n the Persian G u l f 
Whf le the United States convinced the Court that the relevant provision of 
the underlying bflateral treaty could not have been violated by the conduct,'^' 
the Court proceeded to engage in an extensive analysis of why the U.S. attacks 
on the oU platforms violated international law on the use of force, including 
the necessity and proportionality principles.'^' 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, op. cit, f f 228, 237-38. 
Id. J 195. 
Id. f 5 230-31. 
•^^ Id. ff 233-34. 
Id. ff 235-36. 
Id. f 237. 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ff 98-99 (Nov. 6). 
Id f f 73-78. For a reaction from the U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, see W.H. Taft, 
IV, "Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision," 29 Yale ]. Int'l L. 295 (2004). 
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7. Land and Maritime Boundary Disputes 
One of the most important roles played by the Court has been to authorita-
tively delimit land and maritime boundaries placed before it by two States. 
The significance of such decisions lies less in the precedential value of any 
given decision and more in the pragmatic value of resolving a border dispute 
that, in many instances, has led or could lead to armed conflict. For example, 
a disputed area rich in minerals existed along the border of Libya and Chad, 
including the Aouzou Strip. Whi le Chad maintained that the area was part 
of its territory, Libya occupied and administered the area. The dispute ult i-
mately led to armed conflict between the two States in 1986-87. Thereafter, 
the two States agreed to submft the matter to the Court, which in 1994 found 
that the territory fell within Chad, resulting in a Libyan withdrawal of its 
forces."' 
In the realm of maritime disputes, two early decisions - North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf^^ and Continental Shelf between Libya and Tun i s i a ' " - reUed 
on "equitable principles" to divide a shelf where there was no interruption in 
the natural prolongation of the coasts. Whi le the Court indicated that such 
principles required certain approaches, e.g., that a delimitation should not 
refashion nature or that special circumstances could be taken into account,"" 
the decisions provided little guidance as to what was meant by "equitable 
principles" and how they might be applied in other cases. In Gulf of Maine, a 
chamber of the Court indicated that it was "unrewarding, especially in a new 
and still unconsohdated field like that involving the quite recent extension 
o f the claims of States to areas which were unti l yesterday zones of the high 
seas, to look to general international law to provide a ready-made set of rules 
that can be used for solving any delimitation problems that arise.""' In that 
spirit, some decisions of the Court with respect to relatively smooth coast-
lines have largely applied an "equidistance line," the line that connects all 
points at an equal distance f rom the baselines of both the nations, while oth-
ers have taken account of unusual coastlines so as to use a different method, 
such as an angle-bisector approach. '" 
See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
North Sea Continental Shelf, op. cit. 
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24). 
"° See, e.g.. North Sea Continental Shelf, op. cit., f 91. 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, op. cit., f i l l . 
See, e.g.. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
bean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 659, 277-81 (Oct. 8). 
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8. Law of the Sea and Environmental Law 
Separate f rom its maritime boundary dispute cases, the Court has addressed 
important issues on the law of the sea, with its decisions both influencing 
and being influenced by efforts at treaty codification since the early 1950s. 
For example, in Corfu Channel in 1949, the Court asserted that "States in 
time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for 
international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the pre-
vious authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is i>i«oce«f."'" 
This finding strongly influenced codification of the concepts of "innocent 
passage" through the territorial sea and "transit passage" through straits. In 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries in 1951, the Court accepted Norway's method 
of drawing straight baselines connecting its coastal islands, rocks and reefs, 
using language that directly influenced the text of the 1958 and 1982 Law of 
the Sea Conventions."" 
In the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases brought by the United Kingdom 
and Germany against Iceland, the Court rejected Iceland's unilateral claim 
to a preferential fishing zone extending fifty nautical miles f rom its baselines, 
but equally rejected the applicant States' contention that no such preferential 
rights could exist outside the territorial sea.'" W i t h an eye to the ongoing 
negotiations of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the Court accepted that 
the law of the sea was evolving so as to allow preferential fishing rights for 
coastal States extending beyond their territorial sea, which in turn helped 
usher in the concept of the exclusive economic zone in the 1982 Convention. 
Even before entry into force of the convention, the Court would declare that 
it was "incontestable that...the exclusive economic zone. . . i s shown by the 
practice of States to have become a part of customary law."" ' 
Though not actually a case involving environmental law, the Court's deci-
sion in Corfu Channel foreshadowed the emergence of the field of inter-
national environmental treaties. In Corfu Channel, the Court stated that 
Albania's obligation to notify others of the presence of mines in Albanian 
water arose in part f rom "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."'" That 
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9); see aUo S.S. "Wimbledon," 1923 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 22 (Aug. 17). 
Compare Fisheries Case, op. cit, at 133, with United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 7(3), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397. 
See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. 
V. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25). 
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, f 34 (June 3). 
Corfu Channel, op. cit, at 22. 
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finding was echoed i n later "soft law" instruments,"* which in turn helped 
spawn treaty regimes on transboundary pol lu t ion ." ' The Court also issued 
an oft-cited statement about the importance of the global environment in the 
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, by recognizing 
that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, 
the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn. Tlie existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.'* 
In that opinion, however, the Court declined to apply such norms to the 
issue of the legality of the possession or use of nuclear weapons, f inding that 
the "most directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which 
it is seised" was the law on use of force and on war, with its various trea-
ties addressing the use of weaponry and the protection of civilians in time 
of war.'*' 
C . Conclusion 
The International Court of Justice (as was the case for its predecessor, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice) is not at the apex of an appellate 
system of international courts, nor does it have wide-ranging jurisdiction 
over all disputes arising among States. Nevertheless, as the judicial wing of 
the United Nations, the Court stands as the most authoritative Court for the 
interpretation of general rules of international law, with its decisions regu-
larly cited by other global, regional, and national courts. Further, despite its 
limited jurisdiction, the Court has addressed numerous important disputes 
among States and issued advisory opinions that have greatly shaped and 
influenced the development of international law. 
See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-
16,1972, StoMolm Declaration on the Human Environment, prin. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 
.48/14/Rev.l (June 16, 1972); United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, prin. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.l (June 14, 1992). 
See, e.g.. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. 
No. 10, 541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, op. cit., 5 29. 
Id. 5 34. 
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